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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AT
HOME: WHEN PARENTAL AUTHORITY GOES TOO FAR 
KRISTIN HENNING*
ABSTRACT
Although it is virtually undisputed that children have some
Fourth Amendment rights independent of their parents, it is equally
clear that youth generally receive less constitutional protection than
adults. In a search for continuity and coherence in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence involving minors, Professor Henning identifies
three guiding principles—context, parental authority, and the
minor’s capacity—that weave together children’s rights cases. She
argues that parental authority too often prevails over children’s
rights, even when context and demonstrated capacity would support
affirmation of those rights. Context involves both the physical setting
in which Fourth Amendment protections are sought and the nature
of the privacy interest at stake. Capacity considers the minors’
maturity and judgment to safeguard their own rights without undue
parental authority and direction.
Recognizing third-party consent as a useful lens through which to
analyze the Fourth Amendment rights of minors in conflict with their
parents, this Article critiques the Supreme Court’s recent dicta in
Georgia v. Randolph, which significantly undermines the authority
of minors to resist State intrusion into their most intimate space
within the family home—often their bedrooms. Notwithstanding the
relatively narrow context in which Randolph applies, its dicta has
broad implications for the validity of third-party consent in a variety
of parent-child scenarios, including parental consent to a police
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search of computer files, social networking sites, e-mail exchanges,
Internet searches, and closed containers or locked spaces belonging
to the minor.
As Professor Henning argues, the dicta in Randolph oversimpli-
fies, and maybe even mischaracterizes, the Court’s own analysis of
children’s rights in previous cases. As a result, that dicta will
continue to distort the analysis by state and federal courts called
upon to mediate the rights of children in competition with the rights
and duties of their parents. Although parental authority serves a
valuable function in society, this Article contends that absolute,
unreviewable parental authority is rarely, if ever, necessary. Instead,
it advocates for a more faithful and nuanced application of the
guiding principles identified by Professor Henning across cases.
Considering the psychological importance of privacy to minors, the
heightened protection generally afforded to the sanctity of the home,
and the societal benefits of preparing mature minors to serve as
trustees of their own rights, the State’s interest in preserving parental
authority does not provide a sufficiently compelling basis upon which
to abrogate the right of a mature minor to refuse State examination
of his private space or property.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a fifteen-year-old boy walking down the street with his
mother. A police officer suspects the minor has drugs but does not
have enough information to support probable cause, or even
reasonable articulable suspicion, for a search without a warrant.
The officer seeks the minor’s consent to search. Although the minor
immediately declines, his mother responds, “This is my son. Go
right ahead. I want to make sure he is not involved with drugs.” In
this scenario, most would assume that parental consent is no
substitute for a warrant or consent by the child, and any police
search thereafter would constitute a clear Fourth Amendment
violation. However, courts contemplating the Supreme Court’s
recent dicta in Georgia v. Randolph, coupled with the Court’s long-
standing deference to the authority and responsibility of parents to
monitor and control their children, may not find the fifteen-year-
old’s inability to resist State intrusion either egregious or unreason-
able. 
In 2006, the Court held in Randolph that police could not rea-
sonably rely on a wife’s consent to the warrantless search of her
home when her co-tenant husband was physically present and
objecting to the police intrusion.  The Court based its decision in1
large part on “widely shared social expectations” regarding the
marital relationship and the dynamics of co-occupancy.  Since the2
wife “ha[d] no recognized authority in law or social practice to
prevail over [her husband], [her] disputed invitation, without more,
[gave] a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering
than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”  In3
dicta, the Court went on to say that absent “some recognized hier-
archy, like a household of parent and child ... there is no societal
understanding of superior and inferior,” and “[e]ach cotenant ... has
the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were
the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the other
1. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006).
2. Id. at 111.
3. Id. at 114. 
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cotenants.”  States are just now beginning to interpret and apply4
the dicta in Randolph. Some states have already concluded that the
unique nature of the parent-child relationship justifies a “carve out”
to the Randolph rule and relieves the police from deference to a
minor’s objection when there is consent from the parent.  5
Given the paucity of Supreme Court analysis on the Fourth
Amendment rights of children in a traditional criminal context, the
dicta in Randolph has heightened significance. Notwithstanding the
relatively narrow context in which Georgia v. Randolph applies, its
language has broad implications for the validity of third-party
consent in a variety of parent-child scenarios, including parental
consent to a police search of computer files, social networking sites,
e-mail exchanges, Internet searches, and closed containers or locked
spaces belonging to the child.  Although it is virtually undisputed6
that children have some Fourth Amendment rights independent of
their parents, it is equally clear that in some circumstances youth
will receive less constitutional protection than adults. The primary
inquiry in this Article is the extent to which parental authority
should be allowed to override the Fourth Amendment rights of
minors to resist State intrusion. This Article contends that the
Court’s dicta in Georgia v. Randolph oversimplifies, and maybe even
mischaracterizes, the Court’s own analysis of children’s rights in
previous cases, and as a result has and will continue to distort the
analysis of lower courts called upon to mediate the rights of children
in competition with the rights and duties of their parents. 
This Article begins in Part I with a recognition that the Supreme
Court has articulated no singular analytic framework for evaluating
the constitutional rights of minors. Instead, the Court has resolved
these cases in a piecemeal fashion, determining on a case-by-case
basis which procedural rights should be extended to children.7
Notwithstanding the lack of total coherence, the Court’s piecemeal
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., In re D.C., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837, 839 (Ct. App. 2010).
6. A number of jurisdictions have launched special initiatives that send police officers
door to door, without warrants, in high-crime neighborhoods, requesting permission from
parents and grandparents to search children’s bedrooms. See, e.g., A llison Klein, D.C. Seeks
Consent To Search for Guns, W ASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at B01.
7. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
355, 355.
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approach fairly consistently distinguishes the rights of minors and
adults along one of three guiding principles: context, parental au-
thority, and the minor’s capacity. That is, in some cases, the minor’s
rights and protections will be modified to accommodate the special
needs of a given context, while in other cases, the minor’s rights will
be modified to either accommodate the heightened authority of
parents to raise and regulate children as they deem appropriate or
the presumptive diminished capacity of youth to make decisions for
themselves. For purposes of this discussion, the Article accepts the
guiding principles as accurate but seeks greater fidelity and
coherence in their application across cases.
Part I then looks more closely at the import of context, authority,
and capacity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involving minors.
Part I.A lays the foundation for this inquiry by examining the
Fourth Amendment rights of children in various criminal justice
contexts, including traditional on-the-street encounters with police,
State searches in the school, and the minor’s expectation of privacy
in the home without parental interference. Part I.B considers more
generally the limiting effect of parental responsibility and authority
on the constitutional rights of children. Recognizing that parental
authority is not absolute, this Section also reviews the limits of
parents’ rights and identifies the Court’s analytic principles for
reconciling the competing interests of parents, the State, and the
child. Part I.C considers the relevance of child and adolescent
capacity in the evaluation of the minor’s Fourth Amendment liberty
interests in abortion and other medical cases and discusses the
evolution of the mature minor doctrine. 
Part II returns to the narrow paradigm of third-party consent in
Georgia v. Randolph, which presents a useful lens through which to
explore the parent-child relationship and the Fourth Amendment
rights of children. Drawing from the guiding principles articulated
in previous Supreme Court cases involving minors, Part II contends
that there is no principled and coherent justification for a departure
from the Randolph rule when mature minors are at home with their
parents. Part II.A evaluates the nature of the privacy interest at
stake when officers search the child’s private or quasi-private space
at home by considering the heightened protection generally afforded
to the sanctity of the home, the psychological importance of privacy
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to minors, and the societal benefits of preparing minors to serve as
trustees of their own rights. 
Part II.B considers whether parental authority and the dimin-
ished capacity of minors provide a fair and appropriate justification
for denying youth equal enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights
at home. Although this Article recognizes a compelling need for
parental regulation of children’s behavior, this Section asserts that
parents may secure the assistance of the State to help troubled
youth through other legal and judicial mechanisms designed to
preserve the child’s right to due process. This Section also contends
that parents may not be equipped to act in the best interest of the
child in the context of delinquency and challenges the presumption
that all children lack the capacity and judgment to regulate their
interactions with police. In Part II.C, a brief survey of third-party
consent cases involving minors reveals that courts have found
minors as young as eight or nine to have the capacity to consent to
a search of the family home. 
Ultimately, by critiquing the narrow dicta of Georgia v. Randolph
and the cases that have followed, this Article hopes to move courts
away from overbroad deference to parental authority and advocates
for a more nuanced and faithful analysis of children’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The Article encourages use of an analysis that
is guided by the key principles that have elucidated the Supreme
Court’s thinking in other rights-based cases involving minors. 
I. DISCERNING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF MINORS 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourth
Amendment applies to children as well as adults.  As the Court8
8. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches
conducted by public school officials); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27
(1991) (implicitly recognizing Fourth Amendment rights of minors but finding no violation).
For lower courts recognizing the Fourth Amendment rights of children, see United States v.
Doe, 801 F. Supp. 1562, 1567 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to
federal juvenile delinquency adjudications); Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (holding policy of routinely subjecting juveniles detained for violation of immigration
laws to strip searches violated Fourth Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
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noted in In re Gault, “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”  Although there is little dispute9
that minors are entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court has never articulated a coherent and uniform framework
for analyzing the scope of Fourth Amendment rights of children.
Instead, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involving minors has
developed piecemeal, with three broad principles at play: context,
parental authority, and the minor’s capacity. Context involves not
only the physical context in which Fourth Amendment protections
are sought but also the nature of the privacy interest at stake for
the minor. Parental authority invokes the Court’s long-standing
deference to the rights and duties of parents to raise and control
children as they deem appropriate, whereas capacity speaks of the
minor’s cognitive and psychosocial ability to act as gatekeeper of his
or her own rights. 
In some children’s rights and parents’ rights cases, the Court’s
analysis turns almost entirely on one of these principles.  In other10
cases, the analysis involves a more complicated consideration of
more than one principle, such as parental authority and capacity.11
This Section briefly surveys the development and application of
these principles in a few seminal Supreme Court cases.
A. Context Matters 
Context clearly matters in any Fourth Amendment analysis,
whether it involves a minor or an adult. The scope of the Fourth
Amendment protection is measured by the individual’s “‘legitimate
expectation’ of privacy” in a given place, object, or context.  The12
greatest protections are typically granted in the private space of the
home, whereas seemingly lesser protections are granted in heavily
9. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). The Court has recognized a due process right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination for juveniles. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
10. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-41 (recognizing special needs context of school).
11. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (recognizing both authority of parents to
support youth and diminished capacity of minors to make decision as to the commitm ent of
minors to a mental health facility); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 73-75 (1976) (discussing capacity of youth to make important decision to abort and societal
need to encourage minors to seek parental guidance).
12. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
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traveled spaces where the State has a significant public safety
interest at stake.  13
1. Traditional On-the-Street Encounters with the Police 
The individual’s right to move about public streets unencum-
bered by state intrusion is a generally well-protected right absent
probable cause to believe criminal activity is afoot. In evaluating
on-the-street encounters involving children and the police, the
Supreme Court has assumed, without discussion, that children have
the same Fourth Amendment rights as adults.  In 1991, in14
California v. Hodari D., the Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of
a minor’s motion to suppress drugs based on evidence that the child
had never been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and had abandoned the contraband at issue.  The appellant’s15
status as a minor had no bearing on the Court’s reasoning and
analysis.  In 2000, in Florida v. J.L., the Court held that a fifteen-16
year-old’s motion to suppress evidence as fruit of an unreasonable
stop and frisk should have been granted.  There, the Court’s17
analysis dealt entirely with the unreasonableness of the officer’s
reliance on an anonymous tip and made no distinction between the
rights of a minor and those of an adult.  In fact, in a footnote, the18
13. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (discussing the sanctity of the
home), and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (“In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s
home.”), with Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding State’s
interest in preventing drunk driving outweighed the degree of intrusion on individual
motorists who are briefly stopped at sobriety checkpoints), T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-41 (holding
that the legality of a search in schools requires only a reasonableness standard because of the
school’s interest in creating a proper learning environment for students), Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam) (discussing the significantly lesser magnitude of reasonable
privacy expectations in an airport because of government safety initiatives), and Bell v.
W olfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (finding jail’s interest in maintaining institutional security
and preserving internal order and discipline outweighed the inmates’ interests in avoiding
strip searches). 
14. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 624 (1991). 
15. 499 U.S. at 629. 
16. Id. at 626-29.
17. 529 U.S. at 269. 
18. Id. at 270-71.
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Court commented that “the fact that J.L. was under 21 in no way
made the gun tip more reliable than if he had been an adult.”  19
Few state and federal courts have explicitly addressed the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment applies to children in
on-the-street encounters with the police, but virtually all have
assumed as much.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is one of20
the few courts to have expressly identified the basis for a child’s
Fourth Amendment rights in delinquency proceedings.  Relying on21
both the state constitution and the Federal Constitution to apply
the probable cause requirement with full force to juvenile arrests,
the court discussed the evolution of juvenile courts from a purely
rehabilitative model to a hybrid model that incorporates due
process.  The Texas court considered the importance of the Fourth22
Amendment in ensuring privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary government invasion and examined the nature and scope
of other constitutional protections afforded to juveniles in In re
Gault and the series of cases that followed.  The court ultimately23
concluded that the probable cause requirement is necessary to
protect the privacy rights of children and opined that absent this
protection, unreasonable searches were likely to undermine the
rehabilitative goals of juvenile courts by fostering resentment in
the violated child.  24
19. Id. at 273 (unnumbered footnote).
20. See, e.g., In re D.T.B., 726 A.2d 1233, 1236 (D.C. 1999) (holding that defendant’s
fidgeting and nervousness upon seeing police did not alone warrant a Terry stop); In re A.S.,
614 A.2d 534, 538, 542 (D.C. 1992) (holding that there was no reasonable suspicion for on-
street stop when descriptions of suspects on which stop was based described “potentially
staggering numbers of youths”).
21. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W .2d 789, 800-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
22. Id. at 792-94.
23. Id. at 791-95 (discussing history of the juvenile system and eight foundational cases
granting constitutional protections to juveniles: T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (applying
diminished Fourth Amendment standard to school searches); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
281 (1984) (establishing the validity of pretrial detention); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541
(1975) (establishing double jeopardy protections); M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that a jury trial is not required for juveniles); In re
W inship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970) (establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1967) (establishing the rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-
examination, and protection against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
561-65 (1966) (establishing procedural requirements for certification hearings); and Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1948) (establishing protections against coerced confessions)).
24. Lanes, 767 S.W .2d at 795-96.
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Other state and federal courts have joined Texas in relying on
Gault and concluding that the civil and rehabilitative nature of
juvenile proceedings cannot deprive children of the fundamental
constitutional rights to which adults are entitled in criminal
proceedings.  These courts have recognized the punitive and quasi-25
criminal nature of the proceedings and expressed concerns about
the failure of the juvenile court to fully achieve its parens patriae
rehabilitive goals.  In acknowledging the importance of the Fourth26
Amendment exclusionary rule in deterring illegal search and
seizures of juveniles, the courts have concluded that a child who
encounters an officer on the street has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his person and property.  Thus, police generally cannot27
stop or search the child without a warrant unless the circumstances
justify an exception to the warrant requirement. 
2. Fourth Amendment Rights of Children in School 
Notwithstanding the general consensus that children are entitled
to the benefit of Fourth Amendment protections in juvenile
proceedings, the Fourth Amendment rights of children have been
modified in certain “special needs” contexts—most notably schools,
where state officials are responsible for the care and safety of a
large number of youth. Context factored heavily in the Court’s
analysis and ultimate departure from its traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in New Jersey v. T.L.O.  In T.L.O., the28
Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unrea-
25. See Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that even if
juvenile was not deprived of his freedom and was left in the custody of his mother, he was still
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections); United States v. Doe, 801 F. Supp. 1562, 1572
(E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that exclusionary rule applies to juvenile delinquency adjudications);
Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding policy of routinely subjecting
juveniles detained for violation of im m igration laws to strip search violates Fourth
Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Alfredo A. v. Super.
Ct., 865 P.2d 56, 68-69 (Cal. 1994) (holding that Gerstein ’s constitutional requirement of
prompt judicial determination of probable cause for extended pretrial detention of any person
arrested without warrant applies to juveniles as well as adults); In re A.L.J., 836 P.2d 307,
311 (W yo. 1992) (assuming that Fourth Amendment protections apply to juveniles in
adjudicatory proceedings). 
26. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d at 841; Lanes, 767 S.W .2d at 792. 
27. Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 1570-73.
28. 469 U.S. at 339-41.
66 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:055
sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by
teachers and other school administrators at public schools and
school-related functions, but upheld a principal’s search of a child’s
purse at school without a warrant or probable cause.  As the Court29
noted, “[i]t is evident that the school setting requires some easing of
the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordi-
narily subject.”  In balancing the privacy interests of the child and30
the needs of the teachers and administrators, the Court concluded
that the substantial need for “swift and informal” discipline to
maintain order on the school grounds justified imposition of a
reasonableness standard and departure from the warrant and
probable cause requirements.  31
In delineating the scope of students’ Fourth Amendment rights
in school and evaluating the reasonableness of the State action, the
Court considered the nature of the intrusion, the importance of the
government’s interests, and the scope of the child’s expectation of
privacy.  The Court concluded that a school’s search of a student32
will be upheld without a warrant if the search is “reasonable” under
all of the circumstances.  The Court stopped short of requiring an33
individualized reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the
inception of a school search but noted that under ordinary circum-
stances, a search will be justified where there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the student has violated or is violating the
law or a school rule.  34
T.L.O. was not the first or the last case in which the Supreme
Court limited the constitutional rights of children in the school
context. Although the Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines
that “students ... [do not] shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate,”  the Court made clear in cases that followed that35
children have a reduced expectation of privacy in school and school-
29. Id. at 340-48.
30. Id. at 340. 
31. Id. at 337-42.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 341-42 & n.8.
35. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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related activities,  and that schools may need to exercise restraint36
over students.  37
In 1995, in Vernonia v. Acton, the Court held that random drug
testing of student athletes was reasonable by applying a balancing
test that again took into account the nature and legitimacy of the
child’s privacy interest, the degree of the State’s intrusion, and the
State’s interests in the intrusion.  The Court considered the school’s38
interest to be significant in light of extensive drug use among its
athletes, concerns that drug use would lead to injury while playing
sports, and the Court’s view that student athletes were seen as
leaders among their peers.  By contrast, the Court viewed the stu-39
dent’s interest as much less significant because all students have a
lowered expectation of privacy while at school. In fact, from the
Court’s  perspective, student athletes have an even lower expec-
tation of privacy because they routinely submit to a physical exam-
ination to join the team, and in this case, were only asked to submit
to testing conditions that were little different from those always
present in a school restroom or locker room.  The Court further40
emphasized that drug test results were not shared with law
enforcement officials but with only the school administrators who
needed the information.  In 2002, the Court reaffirmed the prin-41
ciples articulated in Vernonia when it upheld the school’s drug
testing policy in Board of Education v. Earls, which required all
middle and high school students seeking to participate in any
extracurricular activity to consent to drug testing.  42
As in T.L.O., the school context was critical in the Court’s
evaluation of the child’s expectation of privacy in both Acton and
Earls.  In Acton, the Court concluded that the warrant requirement43
is unnecessary “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
36. See Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-32 (2002); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
37. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding school’s exercise
of prior restraint over student newspaper did not violate the First Amendment).
38. 515 U.S. at 664-65.
39. Id. at 649, 662. 
40. Id. at 657-58.
41. Id. at 658. 
42. Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
43. Id. at 830; Acton, 515 U.S. at 654. 
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impracticable.”  Such special needs, the Court reasoned, exist in44
the public school context because “the warrant requirement ‘would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,’” and strict adherence to
the probable cause requirement “would undercut ‘the substantial
need of the teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain
order in the schools.’”  In Earls, the Court recognized the schools’45
special need to prevent and deter drug use among school children
and reiterated the view that children’s Fourth Amendment rights
are different in public schools than elsewhere given the “schools’
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”  46
The prominence of context in the Court’s rationale for recognizing
reduced privacy protections in schools suggests that neither T.L.O.
nor the cases that followed support a principle of reduced Fourth
Amendment protections for all youth in all contexts. In fact, even
adults may have a reduced protection in “special needs” spaces like
airports, immigration borders, automobile checkpoints, and jails,
where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is
diminished.  Moreover, although the Court identified age as one of47
the factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of a search
in T.L.O., the Court was concerned that the scope of the search not
be “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction.”  Thus, in T.L.O. and other cases48
44. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. W isconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
45. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
46. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-30.
47. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (discussing Fourth Amendment limitations in jails); see
also Acton, 515 U.S. at 653-54 (discussing special needs leading to reduced protections in
schools and in drug testing of railroad personnel in train accidents in Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); random drug testing of federal customs officers who
carry arms or who are involved in drug extradition in Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665 (1989); automobile checkpoints for illegal immigrants and contraband in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976); and checkpoints for drunk drivers in
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U .S. 444, 465 (1990)); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S.
1, 6 (1984) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983)) (discussing less protection under
the Fourth Amendment in airports because of the increased public interest in safety); Bell v.
W olfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557-60 (1979) (discussing limitation of Fourth Amendment rights in
jails due to legitimate security interests).
48. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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involving the search of a minor, age seems to support greater pro-
tection against invasive State actions rather than less protection.  49
As further evidence that the school cases are fundamentally about
context and not about the diminished capacity of youth or the in-
herent authority of adults to intervene in the lives of children, the
Court expressly declined to recognize any implicit voluntary dele-
gation of the parents’ own authority to search a child to school
officials.  Although the Court acknowledged that schools act in loco50
parentis as supervisors and caretakers for the minor during school
hours, the Court held that in carrying out searches and other
disciplinary functions, the school was not merely acting as a
“surrogate for the parents,” but was a clear state actor.  51
3. Children’s Fourth Amendment Rights in the Home
Like an adult, a child has a legitimate expectation of privacy to be
free from unreasonable searches of his person, house, papers, or
effects.  An expectation of privacy is legitimate and protected if the52
person claiming the interest has a “subjective expectation of pri-
vacy”  in the thing or area searched or seized, and the expectation53
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  As the54
Eleventh Circuit recognized, “privacy is an intuitive interest, and
legal sophistication is not required” for adults or minors to under-
stand subjectively the importance of privacy.  The child’s expecta-55
tion of privacy exists not only in on-the-street encounters with the
police but also in his personal living space. In fact, police entry into
49. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding No. 1, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641-43 (2009)
(holding that strip search of thirteen-year-old was unreasonable given child’s age and absence
of suspicion that drugs were in child’s underwear).
50. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37 (rejecting idea that school officials could claim “the parents’
immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment”).
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
53. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980). 
54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Olson, 495 U.S. at 95-96; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-06; Rakas, 439
U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
55. Lenz v. W inburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing a minor’s capacity
to give valid, knowing consent to enter his parents’ home).
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a home represents the greatest governmental intrusion into an
individual’s privacy.  Thus, absent a warrant or exigent circum-56
stances, the child may deny the police entry into and examination
of his home, bedroom, or personal property within. Further, if a
minor lives alone, society recognizes that even a child reserves the
right to exclude the State absent some exigent circumstances
justifying entry without consent. Even when the child resides with
a parent or guardian, neither police nor society would think it
reasonable for the State to enter the family home, without a
warrant or exigent circumstances, over the express objection of the
one person who is home alone—whether that person is the child or
parent.  57
While it is largely beyond dispute that children have a legitimate
expectation of privacy and security from government intrusion when
they are alone, the reality is that most children do not live by
themselves and are rarely alone.  As a result, a child’s expectation58
of privacy in his living space can rarely be examined in a vacuum,
and children seldom exercise their Fourth Amendment rights in
the home without some involvement or reference to a parent or
guardian. Further, a child obviously has no protection against the
intrusion of his parents into his bedroom because the provision is
meant only to protect the privacy of the individual against state
actors or private actors working in concert with the State.  Thus,59
the child has no recourse in the Fourth Amendment to exclude
evidence at trial obtained by a parent who enters the child’s room,
removes contraband, and delivers it to the police.  The question60
remains, however, whether, and to what extent, the unique nature
of the parent-child relationship should undermine the fundamental
56. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); see also Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57. As one can imagine, there are few or no cases in which the police enter and retrieve
evidence over the child’s objection when the police find a child home alone and have not
obtained consent from the parent in advance. 
58. Kristin Smith & Lynne Casper, Self-Care: Why Do Parents Leave Their Children
Unsupervised? 41 DEMOGRAPHY 285, 292 tbl.1 (2004).
59. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921).
60. E.g., Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (Mass. 1982) (“Evidence dis-
covered and seized by private parties is admissible without regard to the methods used,
unless State officials have instigated or participated in the search.”). 
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principle that children have a legitimate expectation of privacy from
State intrusion into their personal property and private living space.
Context alone does not seem to justify departure from traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis for minors in the home. The reason-
ableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy in his living space
is not diminished by a lack of property interest or even by severe
restrictions imposed on use of the space by an owner or others who
control the property.  Thus, hotel patrons, boarding house tenants,61
and overnight guests all have been found to have reasonable expec-
tations of privacy in their temporary sleeping quarters.  In 2008,62
the Ninth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court’s long-established
understanding that authority to exclude or admit the State for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not equivalent to technical
property rights.  Because the privacy interest that is relevant for63
the Fourth Amendment is broader than the rights accorded in
property law,  a resident need not even pay rent to have an64
expectation of privacy in a place.  Thus, “[t]he important question65
is not who possesses a property right, but rather what are the
dictates of ‘widely shared social expectations.’”  66
The Supreme Court’s examination of the privacy rights of an
overnight guest are instructive. A guest obviously has no legal or
proprietary interest in a home, but a guest does have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his or her temporary quarters.  In67
Minnesota v. Olson, the Court held that Olson’s status as an over-
night guest was, alone, reasonable and sufficient to give him
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Porter, 923 N .E.2d 36, 45 (Mass. 2010) (holding that
juvenile had legitimate expectation of privacy in room in homeless shelter even though not
allowed in room between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.; had to abide by strict curfew; the director had a
master key; and director had the right to enter the room for professional purposes). 
62. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1990) (finding overnight guests entitled
to Fourth Amendment protections in the home in which they stay); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (finding hotel patron entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 452, 456
(1948) (finding boarding house tenant entitled to Fourth Amendment protections in room he
rented). 
63. United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111).
67. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99-100. 
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standing to challenge the legality of the warrantless search of his
host’s home without exigent circumstances or consent by any of the
residents.  The Court found no significance in the fact that Olson68
had never been left alone in his guest’s house and had never been
given a key.  69
Few courts have had an opportunity to evaluate a minor’s expec-
tation of privacy at home without the involvement or consent of
parents. The courts that have addressed the question have recog-
nized the minor’s right to Fourth Amendment protections.70
Appellate courts in both Massachusetts and California have relied
on the principles articulated in Minnesota v. Olson to conclude that
minors have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the space identi-
fied as their home.  In Commonwealth v. Porter, the Massachusetts71
Appeals Court held that a minor had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a room he shared with his mother in a transitional
family shelter and the police could not enter and search without a
warrant.  Likewise, in affirming a minor’s right to challenge the72
admissibility of evidence recovered from his sister’s bedroom against
him in trial, a California Court of Appeal reasoned in Rudy F. that
all family members who regularly live in a house have standing to
challenge state intrusion for the same reasons an overnight guest
would if he were visiting the residence. The court concluded that 
68. Id.; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978); cf. Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261-64 (1960) (holding that conviction for possession of narcotics sufficed to
grant petitioner standing to challenge legality of search), overruled by  United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
69. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98.
70. See, e.g., In re Rudy F., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 490 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that minor
had standing to challenge search of room in home that he shared with his sister);
Commonwealth v. Porter, 923 N.E.2d 36, 45 (Mass. 2010); see also In re W elfare of B.R.K., 658
N.W .2d 565, 574-76 (Minn. 2003) (holding minor who was social guest in host’s home had
reasonable expectation of privacy in home to invoke Fourth Amendment protections to
challenge warrantless search of host’s home).
71. Rudy F., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 490 (holding minor had reasonable expectation of privacy
in his sister’s bedroom when he had access to the entire home and was not excluded from his
sister’s bedroom); Porter, 923 N.E.2d at 45 (holding minor had reasonable expectation of
privacy in his room in a shelter although he was limited in his use of the room, and shelter
staff members had master key and could enter the room for professional business purposes).
72. 923 N.E.2d at 44-47 (holding that consent of shelter’s director could not justify search
of the minor’s room).
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all family members who reside in a home have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from government intrusion in all areas of
the home, even if internal familial rules restrict their use or
access to certain areas. That some parts of a home may be the
predominant domain of a particular family member does not
diminish the expectation of privacy of other family members
from government intrusion anywhere in the home. Family
members do not ordinarily intend their internal rules and
restrictions to set forth the bounds of privacy from government
intervention.  73
 If the context of home calls for heightened—not reduced—
protection for minors who have little or no property interest in the
home, then further exploration of “widely held social expectations”
about the parent-child relationship, parental authority, and dimin-
ished capacity of youth is required to understand the Supreme
Court’s proposed departure from Fourth Amendment protections for
minors at home in the dicta in Georgia v. Randolph. The next sec-
tions explore the unique authority of parents to monitor and reg-
ulate the behavior of children as they deem appropriate and the
presumption that minors need adult intervention because they lack
the capacity and judgment to make good decisions on their own. 
B. Parental Authority: Constitutional Rights and Obligations 
1. Constitutional Right to Parental Autonomy
The notion of parental autonomy is so deeply embedded in
American society that courts have recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in parents’ right to raise children as they deem
appropriate with minimal government interference.  In a series of74
cases from the early twentieth century until now, the Supreme
73. Rudy F., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 491-92 (quoting 5 W AYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 11.3(a) (3d ed. 1996)). 
74. See, e.g., W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of
W estern civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
protection of “liberty” includes right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
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Court has identified a fundamental right of parents to make
decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children.75
As the Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska, “the ‘liberty’ protected by
the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to ‘establish a
home and bring up children.’”  Thus, it is no surprise that the76
Supreme Court is in the habit of staying out of the affairs of the
family and affords great deference to the parents’ ability to act in
the child’s best interest.  77
In Troxel v. Granville, the Court recently reiterated the impor-
tance of allowing parents to decide what is in their child’s best
interests, including the right to decide when and whether to permit
visitation by others.  In concluding that a grandparent’s visitation78
order imposed by the state court was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the mother’s fundamental right to make decisions concern-
ing the care and control of her two daughters, the Court explicitly
accepted the historical presumption that the “natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”79
The Court further acknowledged the absence of any finding or even
allegation that the mother in Troxel was unfit.  As the Court80
stated, “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
... there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parent’s children.”  81
75. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest ... of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.” (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (1923))).
76. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
77. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (Stevens, J., writing for himself
and O’Connor, J.) (discussing parents’ rights to give their children religious schooling and
children’s rights to receive schooling in another language as examples of “the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944))).
78. 530 U.S. at 68 (holding that W ashington statute allowing court to award visitation to
any person when visitation may serve best interest of child violated substantive due process
rights of mother).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
81. Id. at 68-69. 
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Rationales in support of parents’ rights include the parents’
personal fulfillment in raising a child in accord with their own
values, interests, and morals, society’s interest in having parents
guide and instruct children, and society’s interest in diversity that
would be achieved by having each family raise children without
monolithic dictates of the State on moral, religious, and political
views.  As the Supreme Court noted in Bellotti v. Baird, “[t]he child82
is not the mere creature of the State,” but is instead shaped and
influenced by those who care for and nurture him.  Because society83
relies on parents to inculcate values, religious beliefs, and standards
of good citizenship that help children grow into mature, socially
responsible citizens,  “parents and others ... who have ... primary84
responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”  Laws that85
require parental consent or parental involvement in important
decisions by minors or that limit or restrict the child’s right to make
certain decisions, such as the right to marry, vote, and view sexually
explicit materials, not only aid parents in childrearing but also
protect youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity.  Again, as the Court noted in Bellotti, “[l]egal restric-86
tions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role,
may be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in free society mean-
ingful and rewarding.”  Thus, both legislative and judicial defer-87
ence to parental control and instruction prepares children to live
independently and advances individual freedoms and liberty in
society. 
82. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
83. Id. at 637 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
84. Id. at 637-38; W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
85. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (upholding prohibition on sale of
obscene materials to children under seventeen). 
86. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635-37; see also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638-39; In re Hildebrant,
548 N.W .2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the presumption that children’s
immaturity and innocence prevents them from appreciating the full magnitude and
consequences of their conduct as the basis of statutory rape laws). For statutory examples,
see, for example, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33A (W est 1958 & Supp. 1979)
(requiring parental consent for marriage of person under eighteen). 
87. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
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Notions of parental authority include both a right and a
duty—that is, a duty to control the conduct of their children.88
States depend on parents to ensure that children do not interfere
with the right of others to live freely and safely in society.  Parental89
liability laws impose a legal obligation on parents to “exercise
reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control” and are
intended to “safeguard children from those influences which would
tend to cause them to become delinquent.”  Parents who do not90
fulfill this obligation may be held financially or criminally responsi-
ble for a child’s misconduct.91
Recognition that parents have a duty to monitor and control
children’s behavior may provide some justification for the authority
of parents to consent to a search of the child’s bedroom or other
private or quasi-private space set aside for the child in the home. In
the few state cases that have evaluated the parents’ authority to
consent in the child’s absence, courts generally presume that the
parents’ authority as head of the household gives them full access
to the entire space, including bedrooms, clothes, and closets set
aside for the child.  Thus, when a child is not home to object, police92
may reasonably assume that parents have common authority to
permit a search of any part of the home or property within. For
example, in validating a mother’s consent to search her son’s
bedroom, an Illinois court noted that “implicit in the rights and
88. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272(a)(2) (W est 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900 (W est
2011).
89. See sources cited supra note 88.
90. E.g., Brekke v. W ills, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 618 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting People v.
Calkins, 119 P.2d 142, 144 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)).
91. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 490.5(b) (W est 2011) (theft); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (W est
2011) (willful torts); CAL. GOV. CODE § 38772(b) (W est 2011) (graffiti); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
48904 (W est 2011) (school injuries and property damage). 
92. See, e.g., W imberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411, 430 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that
a mother can consent to a search of her minor son’s room because her rights are superior to
those of a child); Speagle v. State, 458 S.E.2d 852, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding in dicta
that officers reasonably relied on mother’s consent to search adult son’s room because she
appeared to have reasonable control of property); In re Salyer, 358 N.E.2d 1333, 1334-35, 1337
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (upholding a mother’s consent to search her fifteen-year-old son’s bedroom
even though he kept it locked); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 701 A.2d 691, 696 (Md. 1997) (holding that
mother had authority to consent to search of minor son’s vest in com mon area of house);
Jacobs v. State, 681 S.W .2d 119, 122 (Tex. App. 1984) (holding that minor had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bedroom because his mother had a right to be in his bedroom and
could consent to the search). 
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duties imposed upon a parent [is] the right to exert parental au-
thority and control over a minor son’s surroundings and that such
implied right to control obviously includes a room in the home of the
mother ... [including] the room occupied by her 15-year-old child.”93
In Maryland, the court of appeals held that a mother had authority
to consent to the search of her son’s vest left in the common area of
the house because she was the head of the household, or in the
alternative, a co-tenant or common resident of jointly occupied
property.  Courts also presume that children assume the risk that94
parents will have access to all rooms and property within the family
home. Thus, in Arizona, the court of appeals concluded that parents
gave valid consent to search a child’s detached bedroom because the
child assumed the risk that the parents would exercise full author-
ity over their home.95
Each of the rationales in favor of parental authority may explain
or justify a child’s reduced expectation of privacy in the home, but
all of the rationales have limits. Thus, although many state courts
have held that the role of parents within the home gives them
greater authority to consent to a search of the child’s private space
in the child’s absence, at least one state court has held that parents
have no special or unique authority to consent to a search of a
minor’s property that is locked and wholly inaccessible to the
parent.  In Scott K, the California Supreme Court held that a father96
could not validly consent to a search of his minor son’s locked
toolbox because he had no shared authority over or access to the
toolbox and therefore did not meet the Matlock common authority
standard.  The toolbox unequivocally belonged to the son; the box97
was locked; the son had the key; and the father did not buy the box
for the son.  Further, although the father had borrowed tools, he98
had never opened the box himself, but had always received the tools
93. Salyer, 358 N.E.2d at 1336. 
94. Tariq, 701 A.2d at 695-97. 
95. State v. Maximo, 821 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
96. See In re Scott K ., 595 P.2d 105, 107, 110 (Cal. 1979); see also In re Joe R., 612 P.2d
927, 936-37 (Cal. 1980) (acknowledging the rule set forth in Scott but holding that the rule did
not apply retroactively).
97. Scott K., 595 P.2d at 110-11 (discussing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171
(1974)). 
98. Id. at 107, 111.
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directly from the son.  In affirming the rights of children in the99
home, the California court stated that “[j]uveniles are entitled to
‘acquire and hold property, real and personal’ ... and ‘a minor child’s
property is his own ... not that of his parents.’”  The court’s100
analysis reveals at least some support for limiting the scope of
parental authority and recognizing the minor’s right to shield
property from State inspection. The U.S. Supreme Court has also
had occasion to articulate more general limits on the breadth of
parental authority as discussed below.
2. Limits on Parental Rights 
Parents’ constitutional rights have been largely carved out in
education, religion, and foreign language cases that attempt to
resolve a conflict between the parent and the State. In each of these
cases, the child appears to be in agreement with the parent or at
least does not articulate an objection to the parent’s view.  In101
Troxel, for example, there was no indication that the daughters
disagreed with their mother’s objection to the visitation order
sought by the grandparents.  Likewise, there was no apparent102
conflict between the parent and the child in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, which struck down a statute requiring all children to attend
public schools,  or in Meyer v. Nebraska, which struck down a103
statute that prohibited teaching the German language to minors as
an unreasonable interference with the “liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.”  Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court over-104
turned the convictions of Amish parents who violated the State’s
99. Id. at 109 n.7.
100. Id. at 111 (quoting Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (Cal. 1955); In re Tetsubumi
Yano’s Estate, 206 P. 995, 997 (Cal. 1922)).
101. W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 n.21 (1972) (considering Amish child explicitly
in agreement with home schooling); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162 (1944)
(considering nine-year-old voluntarily distributing leaflets). 
102. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
103. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 603-04 (1979) (“W e cannot assume that the result in Meyer v. Nebraska ... and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters ... would have been different if the children there had announced a
preference to learn only English or a preference to go to a public, rather than a church
school.”).
104. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923). 
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compulsory school attendance law when they allowed Amish youth
to stop attending school after eighth grade.  The Yoder Court105
affirmed the rights of parents under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and explicitly noted that the children had not
expressed a desire to attend school when their parents wanted them
to drop out.  The Court made clear that the “holding in no way106
determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests”
among the parent, the child, and the State.  107
Although parents’ rights often prevail in competition with the
State, parents’ rights are not without limits and must be weighed
against the rights and well-being of the minor.  To the extent that108
deference to parental authority is rooted in a presumption that
parents know what is best and will act in the best interest of their
children,  that presumption may be overcome by evidence of harm109
to the child,  the risk of error in the parents’ judgment, or conflicts110
in the home that likely undermine the ability of parents to act in
their child’s best interest. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example,
the Supreme Court found a reasonable restriction in a child labor
statute prohibiting young Jehovah’s Witness children from preach-
ing and distributing leaflets in the street.  The Court concluded111
that the parents’ freedom of religion and right to raise children as
they desire were superseded by society’s general interest in the well-
being of the child.  In Parham v. J.R., concerns about the risk of112
error in a parent’s decision to commit a child to a mental institution
105. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
106. Id. at 213-31.
107. Id. at 231. 
108. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 632 (1979) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
district court’s framing of the abortion legislation as a competition of parents’ rights and
children’s rights and not as one of the best interests of the child in Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F.
Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[F]amily itself
is not beyond regulation in the public interest ... [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation.”); see also Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over
Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 977-81 (2010). 
109. See Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment
of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 149 (2000).
110. Ouellette, supra  note 108, at 978-99 (discussing medical cases regulating parents’
imposition of unnecessary or harmful medical care on children to serve the parents’ own
interests).
111. 321 U.S. at 170. 
112. Id. at 166-70.
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prevented the Court from endorsing unfettered discretion for
parents.  113
Interestingly, the debate at issue in Parham  came to the Court’s
attention not as a claim by the parents but instead at the behest of
a class of minors who claimed that Georgia laws allowing parents to
admit a minor child voluntarily to a mental hospital deprived them
of their liberty without due process.  As in many of the parental114
rights cases, the Court readily endorsed a presumption that par-
ents act in the best interests of their children.  The Court cited115
“[w]estern civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children” and reiterated its mantra
that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obli-
gations.”  Thus, although the Court acknowledged that children116
have a substantial and protectable liberty interest in avoiding
unnecessary confinement in a mental institution and erroneous
stigma associated with that confinement, the Court concluded that
parents retain a “substantial, if not dominant, role in the decision
[to commit], absent a finding of neglect or abuse.”  117
Notwithstanding its deference to parental authority and duty, the
Court recognized that the risk of error inherent in the parents’
decision to institutionalize a child is sufficiently great that some
kind of inquiry should be made by a neutral and detached factfinder
to determine whether admission and commitment are warranted.118
The Court explicitly declined to give parents an absolute and unre-
viewable discretion to institutionalize a child for mental health
care.  In deciding what process was due to protect the child from119
an erroneous admission decision, the Court sought to avoid pro-
cedures that would impose high administrative costs for the state or
that would discourage families from seeking needed mental health
services, exacerbate tensions between the child and the parent, and
113. 442 U.S. 584, 598-617 (1979).
114. Id. at 587-88.
115. Id. at 602.
116. Id. (citing W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Pierce
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)). 
117. Parham , 442 U.S. at 600-01, 604. 
118. Id. at 606, 616.
119. Id. at 603-04 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976)). 
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impair the parent’s ability to help the child complete treatment.120
Ultimately, the Court upheld the Georgia statute and was unwilling
to require more involved judicial procedures when the child dis-
agreed with the parents’ decision.  The Court was satisfied that121
Georgia’s procedures authorized admission only after “careful diag-
nostic medical inquiry,” independent judgment by an admitting
physician, and periodic review of the child’s continuing need for
commitment.  On the other hand, the Court was not swayed by122
the appellee’s arguments that the likelihood of parental abuse and
the magnitude of the child’s constitutional rights are such that
a full adversarial hearing prior to voluntary commitment was
warranted.  123
The Court was more willing to impose more comprehensive
judicial procedures to protect the fundamental rights of minors in
the abortion context. Acknowledging a greater risk of conflict and
tension in the family relationship when abortion is considered, the
Court concluded in Bellotti v. Baird that society’s interest in safe-
guarding parental authority and preserving family unity was
outweighed by the rights of mature minors to obtain an abortion
without their parents’ consent.  In Planned Parenthood of Central124
Missouri v. Danforth, the Court reasoned that affirming parental
authority would do little to reestablish unity in the house when the
family is already in crisis.  The Court noted:125
It is difficult ... to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and
his minor patient, to terminate the patient’s pregnancy will
serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such
veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the
120. Id. at 605-10.
121. Id. at 603-04.
122. Id. at 606-07, 613 (noting that at admission a doctor must inquire into the child’s
background using all available sources, including the parents, schools, other social agencies,
and the child).
123. Id. at 602.
124. 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
at 90-91 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W ]e have never held that the parent’s liberty
interest in this relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield,
protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of
harm.”).
125. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
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minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in
conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has
fractured the family structure. Any independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter’s
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.126
As is evident from this discussion, “[a] child, merely on account of
his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”127
Although the Court has opined in dicta on more than one occasion
that “a child, by virtue of his age, has no right to freedom but only
a right to custody since he is presumably under constant parental
control,”  the Court has not always subordinated the rights of128
children to those of the parents and has never granted parents abso-
lute, unfettered authority to expose children to harm or completely
abrogate their fundamental rights. In mediating conflict between
the rights and interests of children and their parents, the Court has
often imposed procedural safeguards that vary with the nature of
the interest at stake and has recognized the maturity of some
minors to make their own decisions and protect their own interests.
The next Section considers the relevance of child and adolescent
capacity in the evaluation of minors’ rights. 
C. Capacity and the Mature Minor Doctrine 
Parental authority cannot be easily disentangled from concerns
about the diminished capacity of youth in many children’s rights
and parents’ rights cases. The Supreme Court’s deference to par-
ental authority grows not only out of respect for the individual
autonomy and liberty interests of parents to raise children in accord
with their own beliefs and morals but also out of a recognition that
because minors often lack the capacity to make thoughtful and
informed decisions for themselves, they need the guidance or dir-
ection of an experienced and mature adult. Thus, in Parham v. J.R.,
126. Id.
127. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[N]either the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”).
128. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W .2d 789, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. 
2011] WHEN PARENTAL AUTHORITY GOES TOO FAR 83
the Court noted that “[t]he law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s
difficult decisions.”  The Court further concluded that because129
“[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need
for medical care or treatment,” parents must make those decisions
for them.130
Given its concerns about diminished capacity of youth, the Court
has consistently recognized the State’s need to adjust its legal
system to account for the unique role of the family and the vulnera-
bility and special needs of the minor.  In evaluating the rights of131
pregnant minors to secure an abortion, the Court in Bellotti v. Baird
acknowledged a need for flexibility in the application of constitu-
tional principles and identified three justifications for concluding
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
adults: “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”  Because imma-132
ture minors often “lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”
and the capacity to make informed decisions that take into account
short- and long-term consequences,  the Court concluded that133
states have a constitutionally permissible interest in encouraging an
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents through parental notification and consent statutes.  134
Notwithstanding the Court’s repeated affirmation of the need for
parental guidance, that need was easily overshadowed by the
fundamental nature and gravity of the liberty interest at stake in
the minor’s decision to abort a pregnancy. Expressing concern about
129. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
130. Id. at 603.
131. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-35 (plurality opinion); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that jury trial is not required for a juvenile); Gault,
387 U.S. at 30 (recognizing that juvenile courts do not have to “conform with all of the
requirements of a criminal trial”). 
132. 443 U.S. at 634. 
133. Id. at 635.
134. Id. at 639-41.
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the finality and temporal urgency of the abortion decision, the Court
ultimately concluded that although 
deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other
choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of
the abortion decision make it inappropriate “to give a third party
an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.”135
 
The Court held that if a state does require a pregnant minor to
obtain consent from a parent, it must also provide an alternative
procedure whereby a competent and mature minor can obtain
approval for the abortion from a juvenile court judge or an adminis-
trative agency or officer.  This approach ensures the minor will136
talk with a parent or other adult, but does not give the parent
ultimate authority or veto over the minor’s decision. 
The minor’s maturity clearly weighed heavily in the Court’s
attempt to mediate the conflict between parents’ rights and chil-
dren’s rights in the abortion context. Presumably as the child
matures, the child’s need for adult guidance decreases. As the Court
noted in Danforth, “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.”  Thus, if the child shows that she is “mature enough and137
well enough informed” to understand the procedure and to make an
intelligent assessment of her circumstances, she is entitled to exer-
cise her right to an abortion without interference by her parents.138
This “mature minor” doctrine reflects a developmental model of
children’s rights that accounts for the evolving capacity of minors to
exercise their own rights. 
Emily Buss has referred to the right of minors to make important
decisions that affect them as a decisional or “autonomy right.”  In139
135. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976)). 
136. Id. at 643 & n.22.
137. 428 U.S. at 74.
138. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
139. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 36 (defining autonomy rights as “rights to make decisions for
oneself”).
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an attempt to resolve the competition among the State, parent, and
child over the developmental control of minors, Professor Buss
argues that a child’s decisional autonomy should prevail when the
minor demonstrates a capacity to initiate choice and the potential
harm arising from the available choices is minimal.  In the abor-140
tion context, for example, a minor who initiates an abortion by
seeking out a medical facility on her own has clearly exhibited the
basic competence and capacity to make decisions for herself.141
Given the minor’s understanding of her own developmental needs
and likely recognition of the long-term consequences of teen
motherhood, the minor’s self-initiated decision to abort is due con-
siderable respect by society. Buss contends that allowing children
to make choices in childhood will facilitate their development of
decision-making skills, enhance their sense of identity, and increase
their competence as rights-holders in the future.  Ultimately142
society benefits when children are allowed to exercise rights and
choices that enhance their development, especially when the risk of
harm is low.  143
Child and adolescent capacity is an important consideration in
any examination of the Fourth Amendment protections owed to
minors. Children are not mere automatons, subject to the will and
authority of their parents. When important liberty interests are at
stake, parental authority should be considered in context and
weighed against the capacity of minors to safeguard their own
rights and interests. The next Part of this Article returns to an
examination of the competition between parental rights and
adolescent autonomy in the home and draws upon the principles of
context, parental authority, and capacity. 
II. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH: WHERE PARENTAL AUTHORITY MEETS
CONTEXT AND CAPACITY
The doctrine of third-party consent provides a useful lens through
which to analyze the Fourth Amendment rights of minors at home
and in conflict with the authority and duty of their parents. Consent
140. Id. at 34-45. 
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. at 35. 
143. Id. at 35-36.
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is a well-established exception to both the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  As long as consent144
is freely given by a lawful occupant, the police may enter even the
sacred space of the home.  The third-party consent doctrine allows145
an occupant who shares mutual use or control of the home to grant
consent when other occupants are not present.  Thus, when two146
people choose to live together, each occupant is presumed to have
common authority “in his own right” to invite others onto the
property, and each is presumed to have “assumed the risk” that his
co-tenants will admit visitors, including the State, in his absence.147
Georgia v. Randolph modifies that doctrine to recognize that an
occupant can no longer be said to have assumed the risk that his co-
tenants will allow others to enter when he is physically present and
objecting.  148
As is common in other Fourth Amendment cases, the Randolph
Court recognized the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct as the
linchpin of any Fourth Amendment inquiry.  When the police rely149
on third-party consent, the Court will consider not only the owner’s
subjective expectation of privacy in the place or property searched
but also society’s willingness to accept that expectation as reason-
able.  In holding that a wife could not validly consent to the150
warrantless search of her home when her co-tenant husband was
physically present and objecting, the Court concluded that the
officers’ reliance on the consent of one tenant in direct opposition to
another, presumptively equal, co-tenant was unreasonable.  The151
Court’s respect for the rights of the objecting tenant in Randolph
was rooted in a belief that members of the household should work
out disagreements on their own and that consent is only valid when
all tenants standing before the officer are in accord.  As the Court152
stated, “when people living together disagree over the use of their
144. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
145. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
146. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
147. Id. at 171 n.7.
148. See 547 U.S. 103, 113-14 (2006). 
149. Id. at 111; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
150. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
151. Id. at 114-15. 
152. Id. at 113-14.
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common quarters, a resolution must come through voluntary
accommodation.”  A categorical rule like the one in Randolph153
prevents police from having to resolve disputes between the
husband and wife and renders the officer’s entry and search
presumptively unreasonable when one spouse is physically present
and objecting.154
Most germane to the inquiry here, however, is the Court’s dicta
in Randolph, which suggests that the Court would not extend the
Randolph rule when the occupants have the relationship of parent
and minor child.  Again, as is common in other Fourth Amend-155
ment analyses, the Randolph Court looked outside of the constitu-
tional text in its evaluation of social expectations regarding the
privacy of adult occupants in the home.  However, because it156
reflected on the status of minors only in passing, the Court did not
identify a source for what it refers to as the “recognized hierarchy”
of superior and inferior in a household of parent and child.  157
This Article assumes that the Court’s understanding of “widely
shared social expectations” in the parent-child dyad emanates from
the guiding principles articulated in the children’s rights and
parents’ rights cases discussed in Part I.  Yet Part II contends that158
the application of those principles to the narrow context of Georgia
v. Randolph provides no principled or coherent justification for
denying the benefits of the Randolph rule to mature minors. In
reaching this conclusion, this Part offers a more nuanced view of the
nature and importance of the child’s privacy interest in the home by
drawing upon research in developmental psychology, examining
parents’ evolving respect for the privacy of minors as they mature,
and considering how society benefits from respecting the privacy of
minors at home. Part II also recognizes that because parental au-
thority may be affirmed and supported in other ways, there is
relatively little justification for undermining the important interests
and benefits that are gained by protecting the rights of mature
153. Id.
154. Id. at 106.
155. Id. at 114.
156. Id. at 114-16; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107
(2008) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
157. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114.
158. Id. at 111.
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minors. Part II goes on to challenge the presumption that minors
lack the capacity to regulate their interactions with the police. 
A. The Randolph Context: Nature of the Privacy Interest
1. Freedom from State Intrusion 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against unreasonable or arbitrary
governmental invasions.  This provision, which “protects people,159
not places,”  confers on the individual a right to be left alone—at160
least by the government.  At its core, a police search into the pri-161
vate or even quasi-private space set aside for children in the home
constitutes State action, even when the search is invited or facili-
tated by a parent. Thus, although the parent’s consent to search
over the child’s express objection clearly evokes a competition
between the will and the rights of family members, it would not be
wholly accurate to cast this debate as one of parent versus child. As
the Court recognized in the mental health context, although it is
the parent who voluntarily admits a child to a mental institution,
the procedures that make the admission possible clearly invoke
State action or “constitutional control” over parental discretion.162
Likewise, in the school context, the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
declined to characterize school administrators as mere surrogates
acting pursuant to a delegation of rights and authority by the
parent.  The principal in T.L.O. was indisputably a State actor163
when he facilitated the search of the student’s purse.164
Home is a sacred space for both children and adults. Like adults,
children need a place to retreat from the public and to avoid
159. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (citing Camera v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967)).
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding wiretapping of public phone
booth unconstitutional absent probable cause). 
161. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
162. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 590-91, 603 (1979). 
163. 469 U.S. at 336-37 (rejecting the idea that school officials could claim “the parents’
immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment”).
164. Id. at 336.
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scrutiny by others.  As noted in Part I, the entry of police into a165
home, for whatever purpose, represents the greatest governmental
intrusion into an individual’s privacy and “is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”  Because166
privacy in the home is accorded such special deference, generally the
State may not enter a home without a warrant, even if there is
probable cause to believe a crime is being committed or a criminal
is hiding within.  The level of intrusion into the private living167
space is no less severe for a minor than an adult. The child’s
bedroom, closet, and other locked space in the home make up the
child’s only zone of privacy. Developmental psychologists have
identified this zone as important in fostering personal identity,
encouraging competence, and promoting security and trust by the
child.  168
In the Georgia v. Randolph paradigm, the child’s need for privacy
and desire to exclude the State from his private space is not
diminished by the parents’ need to regulate the child’s behavior or
the authority of parents to set rules within the home. The distinc-
tion between the parent’s right to enter and regulate the child’s
room and the State’s right to enter cannot be missed. As the Court
noted in Minnesota v. Olson, the overnight guest “seeks shelter in
another’s home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a
place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone
but his host and those his host allows inside.”  Although acknowl-169
165. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (asserting that in view of the
“sanctity of the home ... all details [in the home] are intimate details, because the entire area
is held safe from prying government eyes”); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d
Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) (stating that the home is a “shelter from public scrutiny,
some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle” (citing
Max Radin, The Rivalry of Common-Law and Civil Law Ideas in American Colonies, in 2 LAW:
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, 404 at 423-27 (Jean B. Barr & David Silve eds., 1937)
(referencing the history of the phrase “an Englishman’s house is his castle”))).
166. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
167. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the government
could not monitor a beeper within a private residence without a warrant, probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1984) (reaffirming
reasonable expectation of privacy in fire-damaged premises). 
168. Cindy J. W eigel-Garrey, Christine C. Cook & Mary Jane Brotherson, Children and
Privacy: Choice, Control, and Access in Home Environments, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 43, 46 (1998).
169. 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990). 
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edging that a “host” always retains a superior right to admit or
exclude others from the house as he prefers, the Court made clear
that the existence of a legitimate privacy interest cannot turn on the
power to admit or exclude other civilians from the property.  The170
Court in dicta analogized the interest of an overnight guest to the
protected privacy interest of an adult daughter living in her par-
ents’ home.  Even when parents retain the power to exclude the171
daughter’s guests or to invite others the daughter would prefer to
exclude from the home, the daughter still retains an expectation of
privacy from unwarranted State intrusion.  Like the adult172
husband in Randolph and the adult daughter in Olson, the minor
who expressly objects to the officer’s search of his or her bedroom or
other private space intuitively perceives a fundamental interest in
security and shelter from the State that should be respected. As
explored in the next Section, privacy becomes central to the minor’s
identity and development at a very young age.
2. Psychological Import of Fourth Amendment Protections for
Minors
Although social consensus—not psychological understandings of
privacy—determines the legal zone of privacy, expectations and
consensus necessarily evolve out of common psychological experi-
ences.  Thus, a psychological examination of the meaning of pri-173
vacy for minors is relevant and informative. Psychological concepts
of privacy and security are intuitive at very early ages and then
nurtured and supported by the family and society as the child
matures.  Infants are weaned from the parents’ bedroom very174
early on; families with sufficient wealth have separate rooms for
their children; and parents encourage children to spend time
170. Id. at 99-100.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009)
(stating that the reasonableness of the teen’s privacy expectation was indicated by the
“consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent
vulnerability intensifie[d] the patent intrusiveness of the exposure”).
174. W eigel-Garrey et al., supra note 168, at 43 (“Independence, privacy, and physical
distance from others are generally valued by m ainstream American culture, and children
typically are encouraged to become independent almost from birth.”).
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alone.  As children mature, they are allowed to close the door to175
their bedrooms, and parents choose to knock before entering.  176
Children experience and achieve privacy through control over
their bodies, physical space, and territory,  and a child’s home177
provides one of the earliest opportunities to create and experience
a private space.  Privacy in the home and elsewhere is measured178
by the child’s ability to avoid unwanted interaction with others and
to control the nature of the interactions he does have.  Even179
children who live in homes without a private bedroom may create
privacy in bathrooms, unclaimed areas of the home, or constructed
enclosures created by the youth.  A couch in a living room may180
therefore become a private space for a poor inner-city child. 
Of course, normative restrictions on privacy for minors may be
warranted when society seeks to balance the child’s right to be let
alone with the need for parents and other adults to supervise and
protect the child.  Parents and society may limit a child’s choice181
about privacy to ensure the youth is not engaged in behavior that
society finds harmful or offensive.  In one of the few articles that182
examines both legal and psychological aspects of minors’ privacy,
Gary Melton writes:
[T]enuous application of privacy rights to minors is apparently
based on doubts that they really are autonomous persons whose
physical and psychological integrity is worthy of protection. Such
ambivalence about minors’ personhood is based further on
assumptions that minors are typically incompetent decision
makers who are incapable of free choice and who consequently
are not full members of the moral community.  183
175. Id. 
176. Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts
Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455, 490 (1983).
177. Id. at 458; Weigel-Garrey et al., supra note 168, at 43-45. 
178. W eigel-Garrey, supra note 168, at 44, 47. 
179. Id. at 45. 
180. Id. at 47, 54-55; see also Melton, supra note 176, at 491 (“[S]paces which suburban,
middle-class people may regard as public may take on meaning as ‘private’ places for inner-
city, lower-class children.”).
181. Melton, supra note 176, at 460-63. 
182. Id. at 489; see also W eigel-Garrey et al., supra note 168, at 55.
183. Melton, supra note 176, at 493.
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Given the concerns identified by Melton, privacy rights for minors
may require an evaluation of the minor’s competence and capacity
to exercise private and independent decisions.  Similar to the184
analytic framework advanced by Professor Buss, Melton also sug-
gests that the recognition of both legal and factual privacy rights for
minors involves a balancing of the benefits of privacy to the minor,
including dignity, self-esteem, and enhanced legal socialization,
with the potential harm of misbehavior, which may be shielded by
privacy of the child’s space and information.  185
Research on adolescent development and privacy suggests that
children negotiate privacy with their parents over time. As the child
matures, the need for supervision diminishes and the child’s desire
and opportunities for privacy increase. Thus, any proposed bright-
line rule denying the child a right to exclude police from his
bedroom contrary to the parents’ consent would not adequately
account for the evolving dynamics in the parent-child relationship.
Notwithstanding the primarily hierarchical nature of the parent-
child dyad, there is relatively little justification for allowing police
to intervene in the family dispute when mature minors have begun
to negotiate private space within the family home and the State has
given parents other tools to safeguard and affirm their authority.186
Accordingly, although a categorical rule may be warranted when
police confront adults at the threshold of a home, police may be
called upon to summarily assess the minor’s maturity to consent
when presented with a parent and child who disagree. Albeit more
burdensome than a bright-line rule, police and courts are repeatedly
required and adequately equipped to assess the minor’s capacity in
consent cases involving a minor.  187
3. Societal Interest in Respecting Minors’ Privacy in the Home 
As noted above, research suggests that privacy plays an impor-
tant role in the child’s maturation and development of self-identity,
184. Id. at 489-90.
185. Id.
186. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text for discussion of alternative means of
safeguarding the parental authority. 
187. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text for discussion of police assessment of
a minors’ capacity to consent to search.
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self-differentiation, and autonomy.  As youth mature, both family188
and society have an interest in ensuring that minors are ready and
able to participate in society.  Society ensures that children be-189
come healthy and independent citizens not only by affirming and
supporting parental control and guidance over minors but also by
allowing children to have experiences with privacy, self-determina-
tion, and the exercise of rights.190
There is an especially important value in helping children
understand that they have rights independent of adults in the
criminal and juvenile justice context. Since the Supreme Court’s
seminal ruling in In re Gault,  courts have consistently recognized191
that children have a right to counsel, protection from custodial
interrogation without procedural safeguards, privilege against self-
incrimination, freedom from unreasonable searches of their person,
and a right to confront witnesses against them at trial.  However,192
children are often asked to waive these important rights without the
aid of a lawyer, parent, or other loyal and interested advocate. As a
result, when children find themselves in one-on-one encounters
with the police, including police interrogations and searches, they
must understand that adults generally, and the State in particular,
cannot violate their rights simply because of their status as a minor.
Reinforcing rights not only protects children against unlawful
invasions and coercive interrogations, but ultimately protects the
entire family. When police request permission to search the home
in the parents’ absence, the child must understand that he has a
right to deny the police entry and protect the family’s privacy. At the
extreme, the child must also understand that his right to physical
safety must prevail over the parents’ rights. Most obviously, parents
cannot sexually or physically abuse children simply because they
have “authority.” 
188. Melton, supra note 176, at 460; W eigel-Garrey et al., supra note 168, at 44, 47.
189. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1929) (justifying restrictions on minors by
suggesting they can facilitate minors’ meaningful social participation).
190. W eigel-Garrey et al., supra note 168, at 44-45. 
191. 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55-56 (1967) (establishing the rights of notice, counsel, confron-
tation cross-examination and protection against self-incrimination).
192. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (establishing double jeopardy
protections); In re W inship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (establishing proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
94 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:055
The affirmation of children’s privacy rights not only advances
societal interests, but a threat to those rights may also undermine
the child’s respect for the independence and privacy of others and
foster bitterness in the child. In the criminal and delinquency
context, children often come to understand notions of law, liberty,
justice, and fairness through experience with law enforcement and
other key players in the juvenile justice system.  Evidence sug-193
gests that when children perceive legal rules, procedures, and actors
as unfair and overly paternalistic, they will have less respect for the
law and legal authorities.  On the other hand, when a child be-194
lieves the legal system has treated him with fairness, respect, and
dignity, he is more inclined to accept responsibility for his conduct
and to engage in the process of reform.  Judge White of the Texas195
Court of Appeals summarized it well when he wrote:
Children have the strongest sense of justice .... Such an inherent
sense of justice, however, is fragile and can easily be turned to
cynicism, helplessness, disillusionment and disrespect. Not only
would such an attitude be contra-rehabilitative, but it could
breed dissention and reactionary criminal behavior.... Even a
juvenile who has violated the law but is unfairly arrested will
feel deceived and thus resist any rehabilitative efforts....
Inherent in youth is a malleable nature, and example can be the
most formidable teacher.... Affording a child the essentials of
basic human dignity and announcing a respect for their auton-
omy through the extension of constitutional privacy protections
can only further these efforts.196
193. Kristin N. Henning, Defining the Lawyer-Self: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence To
Define the Lawyer’s Role and Build Alliances that Aid the Child Client, in THE AFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 411, 411-13 (Marjorie
A. Silver ed., 2007).
194. See In re Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 804 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (Fla.
2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44-47 (1999).
195. In re Amendment, 804 So. 2d at 1211; W inick, supra note 194, at 44-47.
196. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W .2d 789, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing Gault, 387 U.S.
at 51 (affirming Fourth Amendment privacy rights of minors in delinquency cases); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 372-75 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 290-91 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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B. Parental Authority in the Home: Scope, Limits, and         
Alternatives 
The most compelling argument in favor of police reliance on
parental consent over the child’s objection is the parental duty to
monitor and regulate the behavior of children. By virtue of the
weighty obligation that society imposes on parents through parental
liability and other laws and norms, arguably parents should not
only be permitted, but also required, to exercise authority over
children and their private space within the home. As one California
appellate court noted following the dicta in Georgia v. Randolph,
“[t]o fulfill their duty of supervision, parents must be empowered to
authorize police to search the family home, even over the objection
of their minor children.”  Although it is certainly appropriate to197
ensure that parents have the support of the State in fulfilling their
duty of parental control, the California ruling and others like it go
too far in giving parents an absolute veto over children’s rights. 
Even in Georgia v. Randolph, the Court readily acknowledged the
wife’s important interests in bringing criminal activity to light. For
example, she may want to deflect police suspicion away from herself
or ensure the safety of her children by having the police remove her
husband’s drugs from the home.  However, the Court immediately198
countered with alternatives available to the wife short of violating
the husband’s Fourth Amendment privileges. The wife may deliver
incriminating evidence to the police, provide the police with infor-
mation to secure a warrant, or in the extreme, seek a divorce or
temporary restraining order.  199
Likewise, parents are not without recourse in dealing with a child
who is suspected of delinquent behavior or poses a risk of danger to
others in the home. The police are always free to enter the home to
seize the child or contraband possessed by the child if there are
exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, imminent destruction of
197. In re D.C., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837, 846 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that because of the
unique nature of the rights and duties of parents with respect to their children, Randolph
does not require the police to defer to an objecting minor child over a consent to search by his
or her parent).
198. 547 U.S. 103, 115-16 (2006).
199. Id. at 116-18.
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evidence, or risk of danger to the police or others inside the home.200
In addition, not only may the parent remove drugs from the child’s
bedroom and provide police with information to support a warrant,
but virtually every state also allows the parent to initiate an
“unruly” or “Child in Need of Supervision” (CHINS) complaint in
juvenile court.  If the CHINS petition is sustained, the parent and201
the child will have access to services such as drug treatment,
counseling, and even residential placement.  The choice between202
a parent’s consent to a search over her child’s objection and the
parent’s delivery of evidence to the police for a warrant or CHINS
petition may appear to be a meaningless distinction, but each of the
latter alternatives provide parents with tools they need to exercise
their authority while simultaneously protecting the child’s right to
due process and preserving the integrity of the child’s relationship
to the State.  203
Although the Supreme Court granted substantial deference to
parents seeking to commit a child to a mental institution  and204
hoped to encourage pregnant minors to consult with their parents
before an abortion,  in both instances the Court was unwilling to205
grant the parent absolute, unreviewable rights.  It would be dif-206
ficult to characterize parental consent to search over the child’s
express and contemporaneous objection as anything other than an
absolute veto. A police entry in these circumstances is facilitated by
nothing more than parental approval—whether motivated by real
suspicion, simple curiosity, the best interest of the child, or more
200. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35
(1970); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950) (search incident to arrest),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
201. See, e.g., CAL. W ELF. & INST. CODE, § 601 (W est 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102
(W est, W estlaw through 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (W est, Westlaw through 2011); GA. CODE.
ANN. § 15-11-2(12) (W est, W estlaw through 2010); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/3-33.5
(W est 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103(51) (W est, W estlaw through 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-22 (W est, Westlaw through 2011) (interpreted in In re Interest of J.G., 547 A.2d 336
(N.J. Ch. 1988)); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 712, 732-33 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (West Supp. 2010). 
202. See sources cited supra note 201.
203. Cf. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116-17 (recognizing that a tenant can satisfy his interests
in exposing criminal activity to the police without relying on a theory of consent that ignores
an inhabitant’s refusal to allow a warrantless search of his property).
204. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01, 604 (1979).
205. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-41 (1979).
206. Id. at 642-43; Parham , 442 U.S. at 603-04.
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sinister objectives by the parent. Even in Parham v. J.R., in which
the Court voiced its highest confidence in the parents’ intent to act
in the best interest of the child, the Court recognized a need to
guard against the risk of error that could lead to unnecessary
hospitalization and stigma inherent in the decision to commit.  207
In third-party consent cases, the concern is not the risk that an
officer’s search will not turn up contraband but the cost associated
with compromising the minor’s evolving understanding of privacy
and appreciation of individual rights—both his own and others—as
set forth in the previous Section.  A warrant or other alternatives208
available to the parents provide adequate procedural safeguards for
the child’s interests without unduly burdening the State or discour-
aging parents from seeking help. The warrant requirement presents
no greater imposition on the State when a minor rather than an
adult is involved, and a CHINS petition will generally require only
minimal screening from a probation officer or prosecuting authority. 
As long as parental authority can be bolstered by other means,
the rationale for denying a child the protections articulated in
Randolph is not convincing. Moreover, reliance on a warrant or
another procedural mechanism has the added benefit of situating
decision making in the hands of those who best understand the
advantages and disadvantages of prosecution in the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. As discussed throughout this Article, the
Court’s deference to parental authority is largely rooted in the
assumption that parents act in the best interest of the child.209
When parents do not or cannot act in the child’s best interest,
however, deference to parents may not be warranted. 
Much like the teen pregnancy context, families with children
suspected of crime or delinquency are often in tension and conflict.
Research in adolescent development suggests that families with
delinquent children have higher rates of conflict and emotional
turmoil than other families.  Delinquency is also associated with210
poor parent-child ties and a history of psychological or mental
207. Parham , 442 U.S. at 606-09.
208. See supra Part II.A.2.
209. See, e.g., supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
210. Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities
Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 848-51 (2006)
(reviewing literature on familial causes of delinquency).
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health problems in the home.  When law enforcement becomes211
involved, parents experience a range of emotions, including fear,
anxiety, shame, guilt, and disappointment.  Parents, who often212
achieve their own status and recognition through the achievements
and failures of their children, may be angry and embarrassed when
the police arrive at the home and request permission to search.213
Further, although there is presumptively little reason to doubt the
motives and judgment of parents in matters of education, religion,
and visitation, it may be unwise to presume a unity of interests
between parents and children in the contexts of crime and delin-
quency. Parents’ motives may be compromised by fear of their own
arrest, eviction from public housing, neglect proceedings for failing
to protect other youth in the home, or criminal charges for contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor.  Thus, the very duty and lia-214
bility that requires parents to monitor and regulate the behavior of
minors creates a potential for conflict in the parents’ judgment. As
the Court concluded that parents’ control of abortion decisions
would not restore order,  it would be equally unreasonable to215
assume that granting parents unfettered control over police access
to a child’s private space or property would restore order and
authority in the home.  To the contrary, the child may be hurt,216
embarrassed, or traumatized by the parent’s failure to protect him
from police invasion and exacerbate existing tensions in the family.
Even without obvious tension or conflict in the home, parents may
not be in a suitable position to decide what is best for the child in
the delinquency or criminal context. As I have argued elsewhere,
parents confronted with the possibility that a child is engaged in
illicit behavior may be eager to have the police intervene without
understanding the alternatives available, such as counseling or
211. Id. at 849.
212. Id.; see also Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial
Interrogatories: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1296 (2004).
213. Henning, supra note 210, at 849.
214. Id. at 856-64 (reviewing range of penal, financial, and other consequences that may
be imposed on parent of delinquent child).
215. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
216. See Henning, supra note 210, at 850, 856-57 (discussing risk of mental, physical, and
emotional burden on parents and further deterioration of family relationship when child is
involved in justice system).
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community-based access to drug treatment.  More important,217
parents may also fail to recognize that a law enforcement search of
a child’s bedroom is rarely conducted to improve the child’s health
or welfare. Instead it is typically initiated to determine whether the
child is involved in criminal activity and to collect contraband or
evidence that may be used against him in a juvenile court proceed-
ing.  In addition, parents who hope to secure rehabilitative218
services for the child or to teach the child a moral lesson too often
have an exaggerated view of what the juvenile justice system can
achieve by way of treatment and rehabilitation and have limited
knowledge of the long-term negative consequences associated with
involvement in the court.  219
Today, even a single arrest can label a child as a delinquent
to teachers, parents, employers, and law enforcement officers.220
Worse, delinquent youth could face inclusion on sex offender
registries, transfer for prosecution in adult criminal court, eviction
from public housing, expulsion from school, and other stigma that
could limit the child’s educational or employment goals and subject
him to further police surveillance or unwarranted arrests.  Many221
youth also experience considerable psychological trauma in deten-
tion, while others face peer pressure to conform to the behavior of
older youth in the juvenile justice system. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Schall v. Martin, “the impressionability of juveniles
may make the experience of incarceration more injurious ... all too
quickly juveniles subjected to ... detention come to see society at
large as hostile and oppressive and to regard themselves as irre-
mediably ‘delinquent.’”  Further, as the Court of Criminal Appeals222
of Texas recognized, “[d]etention can be extremely destructive to a
child’s life and act as a determinative factor toward recidivism.”223
217. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
218. Henning, supra note 210, at 851-52. 
219. Id. at 850-51. 
220. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W .2d 789, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1971)). 
221. Id. at 796; see also Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency
Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
520, 557 (2004).
222. 467 U.S. 253, 291 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Lanes, 767 S.W .2d at 796. 
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Given the many detrimental consequences that may follow police
intervention after the parents’ consent to search, as well as the
existence of alternatives that maintain parental authority while
preserving the child’s privacy vis-à-vis the State, the Court’s dicta
in Randolph gives too much deference to parents. This conclusion is
further supported by courts’ long-standing recognition that minors
have the capacity to consent to a search of their and their parents’
property as explored in the next Section. 
C. The Minor’s Capacity and Authority To Consent
The serious outcomes that often accompany a police search of a
child’s space or property in the home provide considerable justifica-
tion for deference to those minors who exhibit some capacity to
safeguard their own rights and interests. The very act of objecting
is the type of independent conduct that signals maturity, self-
identity, and autonomy, and that justifies recognition of a child’s
capacity and rights.  A child who has the foresight to object to the224
police intrusion has likely taken into account the long-term con-
sequences associated with arrest, prosecution, and adjudication.
Moreover, because parents are always free to encourage—and even
coerce—the child to consent, as long as they are not acting as an
agent of the State, the child may also take the parent’s views into
consideration.
Professor Buss’s framework of decisional autonomy may be partic-
ularly suited to this context where the degree of harm associated
with the child’s refusal to consent may be contained or ameliorated
by other strategies to meet the needs of troubled youth.  Unlike225
the immediate and irreversible consequences of the abortion
decision,  a child’s exclusion of police from his bedroom may deny226
the state immediate access to contraband, but it does not leave the
parent or police without recourse.  If, as noted above, no exigent227
circumstances justify the officer’s warrantless entry into the home,
224. See Buss, supra note 139, at 40 (“[C]hildren will only self-initiate [take independent
action in furtherance of the right] if they have a high level of conviction (and perhaps
sophistication) about the exercise of the right.”).
225. See id. at 34-45.
226. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979). 
227. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
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the parent may seek State intervention through appropriate judicial
mechanisms or community-based treatment alternatives. Although
contraband may be destroyed in the interim, these are trade-offs
American society has always been willing to accept to ensure
privacy and autonomy—at least for adults—in the most respected
place of the home.  In addition, evidence suggests that most youth228
will age out of delinquent behavior by late adolescence and few will
persist in a lifetime of crime and delinquency.  Thus, the long-term229
harm of adolescent illicit behavior is significantly reduced.
State and federal courts have long factored capacity into third-
party consent analysis involving minors. Based on these court
rulings, it simply cannot be said that all youth lack the capacity to
make decisions about whether to grant or deny police entry into the
home. Courts have repeatedly held that mature minors have the
capacity to consent to a search, not only of their own property, but
also to a search of the family home and property within.  Although230
the third-party consent doctrine has largely developed in cases
involving adults,  a brief survey of third-party consent cases231
involving minors and their parents reveals few per se rules and
reaffirms the principle that the resolution of conflicts between
adults and children may vary according to the minor’s capacity to
consent.
In traditional third-party consent analysis, each occupant has
authority in his own right to grant or deny admission to the space
that is available for the mutual use or control of all.  The validity232
and scope of the child’s common authority within the home is most
often tested when a parent challenges the seizure of evidence from
the family home after a child consents to a police search in the
parent’s absence. Although courts have adopted widely varying
228. See Melton, supra note 176, at 489 (“On the other hand, minors are not necessarily
recognized as autonomous, and both parents and the state have been accorded considerable
authority to ‘protect’ adolescents from themselves.”).
229. Henning, supra note 221, at 539 (discussing research on adolescent development and
trajectory of delinquency).
230. See infra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
232. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974); see also United States v. Rith,
164 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a woman who was held against her will in
defendant’s residence for two m onths could give her consent to search the residence (citing
United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1990))).
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approaches in evaluating the authority of minors to consent, most
courts have found that at least mature minors have sufficient
common authority to consent to a police search of common areas in
the home.  Only one state, Montana, presumptively rejects the233
consent of a minor under sixteen to search the parent’s home due to
enhanced privacy protections under the state constitution.234
Although some jurisdictions consider the totality of the circum-
stances,  others, such as the Sixth Circuit, have found a presump-235
tive validity in the consent of a mature minor.  As the Sixth236
Circuit noted, “there is every reason to suppose that mature family
members possess the authority to admit police to look about the
family residence, since in common experience family members have
the run of the house.”  Applying the common authority test from237
Matlock, the court held that absent a “clearly manifested ... expec-
tation of exclusivity,”  “all rooms in the residence can be said to be238
areas of usage common to all members of the family.”  The third-239
party consent doctrine 
does not rest upon the law of property ... but rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit
the inspection in his own right and that the others have as-
sumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
common area to be searched.  240
In evaluating common authority under the totality of the
circumstances, courts will consider the minor’s age and mutual use
233. See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
234. See State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006) (establishing the per se rule that
minors under sixteen do not have the capacity or authority to relinquish their parents’ privacy
rights); see also State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 156 (Mont. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s
thirteen-year-old daughter could not give valid consent to search of her bedroom in her
father’s residence after a police officer responded to a report that the defendant had sexually
assaulted the daughter). 
235. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text. 
236. See United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990).
237. Id. at 777. 
238. Id. at 778. 
239. Id. at 777. 
240. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
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of the property, the minor’s right of access to the premises to be
searched, the minor’s right to invite others onto the property, and
whether the officers acted reasonably in believing the minor was of
an age at which he or she could be expected to exercise at least
minimal discretion and had sufficient control over the premises to
give a valid consent to the search.  Some courts will also attempt241
to determine whether the child understands the consequences of the
right to privacy held by the child’s parents.  Courts have held that242
minors ranging in ages from eight to sixteen have the authority and
capacity to consent to a warrantless search when they live in and
have unrestricted access to the property.  Even the Supreme Court243
241. See, e.g., People v. Hoxter, 75 Cal. App. 4th 406, 413-14 (1999) (holding that sixteen-
year-old had authority to consent to search of her parents’ home when she engaged in conduct
consistent with her authority over the property, such as supervising the conduct of her
younger sister and twice inviting the officers to enter); Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952, 958
(Fla. 1993) (holding that fifteen-year-old minor could validly consent to search parents’ home
when he had a key and shared common household duties); Davis v. State, 422 S.E.2d 546, 549
(Ga. 1992) (holding that, under the four-part test, a ten-year-old child home alone for ninety
minutes “had no right, absent an emergency, to invite anyone into the house while he was
alone there, much less into his parents’ bedroom”); Atkins v. State, 325 S.E.2d 388, 390-91
(Ga. App. 1984) (applying a four-part test and finding defendant’s seventeen-year-old brother’s
consent to search valid), aff’d, 331 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. 1985); see also People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d
757, 764 (Cal. 1987) (holding that eleven-year-old did not have authority to consent to search
of her parents’ home but acknowledging that “[a]s a child advances in age she acquires greater
discretion to admit visitors on her own authority”). 
242. Abdella v. O’Toole, 343 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136-37 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that there
was no factual basis to support that an eleven-year-old had authority to consent to a search
of her parents’ house).
243. See, e.g., Lenz v. W inburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that eight-
year-old had authority to consent to her guardian ad litem’s entry into her grandparents’
home because she effectively resided with the grandparents and had free access to the living
room); State v. Lotton, 527 N.W .2d 840, 844 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding valid consent by
ten-year-old); see also United States v. Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 689 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that fifteen-year-old had authority to consent to search of parents’ house because she lived
there full time and had unrestricted access); United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant’s two teenaged sons could give valid consent to search
defendant’s house and bedrooms); United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 1225, 1231
(10th Cir. 1989) (upholding fourteen-year-old’s consent for police to enter motel room she
shared with her father); United States v. Mathis, 377 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-45 (M.D. Tenn.
2005) (holding that sixteen-year-old had the authority to consent to search of father’s house
if he shared the living quarters and was frequently left in charge of the house); Allen v. State,
44 So. 3d 525, 532-33 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (adopting rule that minors can give third-party
consent and holding that, according to the Atkins factors, a seventeen-year-old’s consent was
valid); State v. Tomlinson, 2002 W I 91, ¶ 33, 648 N.W .2d 367, 377 (holding that officers could
reasonably conclude that a high-school-aged child would have some authority to allow limited
entry into the family home).
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in Randolph, acknowledged that “a child of eight might well be
considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the
threshold into that part of the house where any caller, such as a
pollster or salesman, might well be admitted.”244
As evident in this brief survey, the minor’s maturity and apparent
cognitive capacity has factored heavily into the validity of the
minor’s consent, and most courts have rejected the idea that minors
categorically lack the capacity to consent to a search of the family
home.  Recognizing that legal sophistication is not necessary for an245
appreciation of the privacy interest, the Eleventh Circuit has con-
cluded that minors need not be presumed incapable of consenting.246
At the threshold of a residence, police may inquire of the minor’s age
and assess the minor’s maturity in preliminary conversation. On
review, the courts may evaluate the voluntariness of the minor’s
consent by considering factors such as the age, vulnerability, matu-
rity, intelligence, and education of the consenting minor.  The247
younger and less mature the child, the less likely the court is to find
that the child gave valid consent and understood the consequences
of consenting to the search.  However, even a younger child may248
demonstrate voluntariness through his or her actions, including
inviting officers into the home and freely showing them around the
dwelling.  249
In contrast to the many courts that have found mature minors
have authority to consent, some judges have taken issue with the
application of third-party consent rules originally designed for adult
244. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006) (quoting 4 W AYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 8.4(c), at 207 (4th ed. 2004), but speculating that “no one would reasonably
expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’
bedroom”).
245. See Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548-49.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also People v. Hoxter, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
sixteen-year-old could reasonably give consent due to her age and mature conduct).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413-16 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(holding that twelve-year-old lacked actual and apparent authority to consent, and consent
was not voluntary given disparity in age, size, and maturity between twelve-year-old and
officer); Davis v. State, 422 S.E.2d 546, 549-50 (Ga. 1992) (holding that ten-year-old did not
give valid consent when he showed immaturity and naivety).
249. See, e.g., Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1549 (collapsing the voluntariness and common authority
analyses and holding eight-year-old’s consent to search grandmother’s house by a guardian
ad litem was voluntary).
2011] WHEN PARENTAL AUTHORITY GOES TOO FAR 105
relationships to those involving children. In a concurrence, Judge
Carlos Lucero expressed dismay over the Tenth Circuit’s application
of the third-party consent reasoning to consenting minors in the
home.  Referencing the Supreme Court’s dicta in Randolph, Lucero250
contended that although children do often have control of the
parent’s home when they are left alone, “one normally assumes that
a minor child is not allowed to invite guests into the home absent a
parent’s approval.”  Instead, he contended, a minor’s authority251
over the home is “dependent upon and limited by a parental grant
of responsibility.”  Although Judge Lucero would not impose a per252
se ban on third-party consent by minors in the family home, he
argued for a default presumption that a minor who answers the door
lacks the authority to consent to a search of the home.  Only when253
the government can demonstrate that parents gave the child
permission to invite guests will the presumption be overcome.  254
Notwithstanding the concerns voiced by Judge Lucero and a
minority of state courts,  the third-party consent doctrine gener-255
ally does not ask courts to inquire whether the absent occupant has
given express permission for other tenants to authorize the police
search.  Further, in affirming the authority of minors to consent256
to a search of the parents’ home, courts have recognized the
legitimate need for consent in law enforcement tactics as a policy
rationale that militates against a bright-line rule prohibiting minor
consent.  It would be disingenuous for courts to construct a bright-257
line rule that all minors lack the capacity and authority to exclude
250. United States v. Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 692-98 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J.,
concurring).
251. Id. at 694.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 697-98.
254. Id. at 698; see also People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 762-63 (Cal. 1987) (finding that
eleven-year-old child’s consent to police search of parents’ home was invalid and noting that
“parent has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room to the discretion of the ...
child; rather, the latter [has] privacy of place there in the discretion of the former” (quoting
Lloyd W einreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 60 (1974)));
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 387 A.2d 46, 55 (Pa. 1978) (holding that sixteen-year-old’s consent
to search of her mother’s home was ineffective because the minor did not have dominion over
home equal to that of the mother, and the mother had the power to determine extent of the
minor’s authority to admit people to the house).
255. See supra note 249.
256. Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
257. See Lenz v. W inburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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the police in the face of parental consent given the many cases in
which the courts have admitted incriminating evidence against the
child or the parent after validating the child’s consent to search.258
Although police may benefit from a bright-line rule that allows
parental consent to override the minor’s objection, a case-by-case
determination of maturity is exactly what the courts have asked the
police to do in other third-party consent cases. If the child appears
to be of a certain age, can understand and articulate consent, seems
to have unrestricted access to the home, and is left alone with
responsibilities in the house, courts have consistently upheld the
minor’s consent as valid.259
It is worth noting that adult children are generally afforded
greater privacy than minors in areas set aside for them in their
parents’ homes. Thus, parents are not generally found to have
superior authority or even sufficient common authority to consent
to a search of areas set aside for the exclusive use or control of an
adult child.  Most courts evaluate these cases with a totality of260
circumstances test that considers the age of the adult child, any
explicit agreements between the adult child and the parent, the
frequency of the parents’ presence in the room to clean or visit with
the adult child, and the adult child’s effort to keep his bedroom
locked.  Adult children who have established a landlord-tenant261
258. See cases cited supra note 245.
259. See supra note 243. 
260. See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that parent
could not give permission to search her adult son’s locked footlocker in his bedroom); People
v. Daniels, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding that mother could consent to search
of adult son’s bedroom and dresser but not a suitcase); People v. Egan, 58 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629-
30 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that stepfather’s consent to search did not apply to the content of
his adult stepson’s bag); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1248 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding
that mother had the authority to search her adult son’s room but not a locked toolbox to which
she did not have a key); State v. Miyasato, 805 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that mother could not consent to search of son’s desk drawer); Brown v. State, 358
So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Miss. 1978) (holding that mother validly consented to search of adult
defendant’s dirty clothes hamper in kitchen); People v. Snipe, 841 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct.
2007) (holding that mother could not consent to a search of a padlocked closet that contained
her adult son’s personal items). But see Colbert v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W .3d 777, 783 (Ky.
2001) (holding that mother had superior property interest in home that allowed her to search
her adult son’s room for weapons).
261. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 807 So. 2d 18, 34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that a
mother clearly had the authority to consent to the search of her eighteen-year-old son’s
bedroom); State v. Vinuya, 32 P.3d 116, 131-32 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that mother
could not consent to search of adult son’s bedroom because he kept it locked and prevented
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relationship with their parents are generally afforded greater
protections than adult children who remain dependent on parents
for shelter and living expenses.  Both before and after Randolph,262
state courts have been generally unwilling to honor the consent of
a parent or guardian over the express objection of an adult child
living in the parents’ home.  In these cases, the adult child is263
treated as a joint or co-tenant of equal status as the parent. The few
pre-Randolph cases that have upheld the consent of a parent over
the express objection of an adult child may no longer be valid. 
Because minors do not achieve adulthood overnight, there is
considerable justification for the evolving recognition of rights for
minors as they mature and are afforded greater privacy in the
family home. Thus, application of the mature minor doctrine to the
Randolph context would be more faithful to the principle of capacity
followed in other children’s rights cases and would give minors an
opportunity to develop decision-making skills and increase their
capacity to safeguard their own rights in the future. 
other family members from entering even when he was in the house); State v. Ham, 744 P.2d
133, 135 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (holding that m other could consent to search adult son’s
bedroom because she had regular access to the room); Huspon v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1078,
1081-82 (Ind. 1989) (holding that mother had authority to consent to son’s bedroom search
because he lived there rent-free).
262. See United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1331 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating the fact that
the adult child did not pay rent supported the presumption of the parent’s control over the
child’s room); State v. Brown, 558 So. 2d 1054, 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
mother could consent to search of her adult son’s room because she paid his living expenses
and he submitted to her rules); Howard v. State, 427 S.E.2d 96, 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that mother could consent to a search of her adult son’s bedroom because he did not
pay any rent or contribute to any living expenses); Huspon, 545 N.E.2d at 1081-82 (holding
that mother had sufficient authority to consent to search adult child’s bedroom  because he
lived there rent-free and shared the room).
263. Martin v. United States, 952 A.2d 181, 188 (D.C. 2008) (holding that mother’s consent
did not override adult son’s refusal to consent to search); Shingles v. State, 872 So. 2d 434,
438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding a search illegal when grandmother gave consent but
defendant was available and had already refused); Carter v. State, 762 So. 2d 1024, 1025-26
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that parents’ consent to search adult child’s room is not
controlling if child is present and objecting). But see Rith, 164 F.3d at 1323 (holding that
parents have a presumption of control that allows them to consent to search over eighteen-
year-old’s protests); Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (Ct. App. 1970)
(holding that parent could consent to search of bedroom shared with his adult son over his
son’s protests).
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CONCLUSION
Although Georgia v. Randolph only directly implicates a small
category of third-party consent cases involving adult tenants who
are physically present and objecting to a police search, the Court’s
dicta concerning the parent-child hierarchy oversimplifies the
analysis of children’s rights in previous cases and has broader
implications on the parent’s authority to waive or abrogate the
Fourth Amendment rights of children in any encounter with the
police. Overreliance on the Court’s long-standing deference to
parental authority coupled with the Court’s more recent dicta in
Randolph has and will likely continue to distort state and federal
courts’ analysis of children’s rights in competition with the rights
and duties of parents. 
In a search for continuity and coherence in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence involving minors, this Article identifies three guiding
principles—context, parental authority, and the minor’s capac-
ity—that weave together children’s rights cases and advocate for a
more faithful and nuanced application of those principles in future
cases. Although children have no expectation of privacy or constitu-
tional authority to ward off a parent’s inspection of their bedroom,
closet, e-mail, or other computer exchange, a minor retains the
greatest interest and protected right in avoiding the State’s
intrusion into their most intimate living space and private property.
The principles of context and capacity provide a fair and reasonable
balance to the dominance of parental authority in the evaluation of
privacy rights for minors. Without such balance, complete deference
to parental authority threatens to undermine children’s privacy at
every level. At its extreme, uncontained parental authority might
even sanction a police search of the child’s physical body over the
child’s express and vehement objection. 
Although parental authority serves a valuable function in society,
this Article contends that absolute, unreviewable authority is
rarely, if ever, necessary or appropriate for parents. In the third-
party consent context, for example, the State’s legitimate interest in
preserving the authority of parents to care for and discipline
children may be satisfied without the severe intrusion of a
warrantless police search over the child’s objection. Parental
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authority is not undermined by requiring parents to satisfy
procedural hurdles, such as providing police with information and
evidence to support a warrant, initiating a CHINS proceeding, or
securing treatment and services from community-based or non-
penal government providers. Further, deference to parents in de-
cisions that affect their children presumes the existence of normal
family relationships and the involvement of parents who are willing
and able to act in the best interest of the child. Because research
suggests that these presumptions may not be appropriate in the
criminal or delinquency context due to preexisting family conflict,
tension arising at the onset of suspected delinquent behavior, or
exaggerated views by parents about what the juvenile justice system
can accomplish with youth, the added safeguard of a warrant or
other judicial review is needed when the rights of allegedly delin-
quent minors are at stake. 
Finally, it is undeniable that some minors have the capacity to
exercise rights and regulate their interactions with police. Recogniz-
ing a mature minor’s right to privacy from the State in his parents’
home—even over his parent’s objection—comports with the evolving
capacity of the child as a decision maker and recognizes the societal
benefits that are achieved when children’s privacy is protected.
Considering the psychological importance of privacy to minors, the
heightened protection generally afforded to the sanctity of the home,
and the societal benefits of preparing mature minors to serve as
trustees of their own rights, the State’s interest in preserving
parental authority does not provide a sufficiently compelling basis
upon which to abrogate the right of a mature minor to refuse State
examination of his private space and property at home.
